Superior Court of California County of San Bernardino 303 West Third Street, Dept. S32 San Bernardino, CA 92415-0210



# IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO SAN BERNARDINO DISTRICT

| DEN KIMBLE -4 -1     | Case No.: CIVDS 1012922 |
|----------------------|-------------------------|
| BEN KIMBLE, et al    | RULING ON PETITION FOR  |
| Plaintiffs           | COORDINATION            |
| vs.                  |                         |
| KAMALA HARRIS, et al |                         |
| Defendants.          |                         |

This matter came before the Court for a hearing on a Petition for Coordination.

The Court has reviewed and considered the briefs of the parties as well as the oral arguments of counsel and issues its ruling as follows.

# Factual and/or Procedural Context

At issue is a Petition for Coordination of Proceedings. Petitioners are all defendants and plaintiffs in *Kimble*, et al. v. Harris, et al., Case No. CIVDS1012922, San Bernardino County, filed September 15, 2010.<sup>1</sup>

The petitioners seeking coordination include *Kimble* defendants: Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General of California; Charlton H. Bonham, Director of Calif. Dept. of Fish & Game (in his official capacity); and Calif. Dept. of Fish & Game ("DFG"). These defendants state that one or more of them are parties to every other action sought to be coordinated. (Solomon Decl. ¶ 5.) Petitioners also include *Kimble* plaintiffs: Ben Kimble; Ronald Hansen; Ron Kliewer; Eric Rasbold; Terry Stapp; Delores Stapp; Gary Goldberg; Gerald Hobbs; Public Lands for the People, Inc. ("PLP"); Patrick Keene; Keene Engineering Company, Inc.; and Walt Wegner. The petition for Coordination was submitted on the declaration of Bradley Solomon, Deputy Attorney General and Petitioner's Request for Judicial Notice.

On June 15, 2012, the Judicial Council entered an Order Assigning Coordination Motion Judge and authorizing the Presiding Judge of San Bernardino County Superior Court to assign the matter to a coordination motion judge to determine whether the following actions are complex pursuant to CRC 3.502 and if so, whether coordination of the actions is appropriate. In the event of coordination, the Order also directed the coordination motion judge to: (1) recommend a particular superior court for the site of the coordination proceedings, pursuant to CRC 3.530; and (2) select the reviewing court having appellate jurisdiction if the actions to be coordinated are within the jurisdiction of more than one reviewing court, pursuant to CRC 3.505(a). On June 15, 2012, Presiding Judge Hon. Ronald Christianson of San Bernardino County Superior Court appointed this court as the coordination motion judge.

The six actions subject to this motion are:

- Karuk Tribe of California, et al. v. Calif. Dept. of Fish & Game, et al., Case
   No. RG5211597, Alameda County, filed May 6, 2005 ("Karuk l");
- Hillman, et al. v. Calif. Dept. of Fish & Game, et al., Case No. RG09434444, Alameda County, filed February 5, 2009 ("Hillman");
- Kimble, et al. v. Harris, et al., Case No. CIVDS1012922, San Bernardino County, filed September 15, 2010 ("Kimble");
- Karuk Tribe, et al, v. Calif. Dept. of Fish & Game, et al., Case No. RG12623796, Alameda County, filed April 2, 2012 ("Karuk Il");
- Public Lands for the People, et al. v. State of California, et al., Case No. CIVDS1203849, San Bernardino County, filed April 12, 2012 ("PLP"); and

In addition, dated May 7, 2012, plaintiffs in the *The New 49'ers, Inc., et al. v. Calif. Dept. of Fish & Game, et al.*, Case No. SCCVCV1200482, Siskiyou County, filed April 13, 2012, submitted a response to the Petition for Coordination, in which they stated that they did not oppose coordination, "as a general, abstract form of relief." They wrote separately to raise two issues and asserted the cases should be coordinated in either San Bernardino County or Siskiyou County.

The New 49'ers, Inc., et al. v. Calif. Dept. of Fish & Game, et al., Case No. SCCVCV1200482, Siskiyou County, filed April 13, 2012 ("New 49'ers").<sup>2</sup>

With respect to the Petition, on June 26, 2012, the court heard the Kimble and New 49'ers plaintiffs' ex parte motion to stay all actions subject to the Petition for Coordination. The court granted the motion. In addition, the court set the Petition for Coordination for hearing, with a briefing schedule for opposition and reply.

On July 18, 2012, plaintiffs in *Karuk I*, *Hillman*, and *Karuk II*, filed opposition to the Petition for Coordination.<sup>3</sup>

On July 27, 2012, "The Kimble and CEQA Miners" filed a reply. In addition, on July 30, 2012, New 49'ers plaintiffs filed a reply in support of the Petition for Coordination.

# History of Related Lawsuits, Legislation and Other Actions

Because of the factors to be considered in deciding whether an action is complex and standards set forth in CCP § 404.1 rests on the relationship between the various actions at issue, enacted legislation, and other actions, a brief discussion of the actions and other relevant events is required.

# A. Karuk I (May 2005)

In 2005, the Karuk Indian Tribe and its vice-chairman, Leaf Hillman, filed a lawsuit against DFG in Alameda County Superior Court, seeking a finding from the trial court that DFG's practice of issuing dredge and suction mining permits for the Klamath,

In its opposition, *Karuk* plaintiffs assert there is a seventh case, *Walker v. Harris, et al.*, Case No. RG12630513, Alameda County, filed May 16, 2012. *Walker* (in pro per) sought a writ of Coram Nobis, Writ of Review and Certiorari or Alterative Writ and Declaratory Relief re the constitutionality of SB 670 and AB 120 § 12. (Saxton Decl. ¶ 9 & Ex. 7.) *Karuk* plaintiffs assert that with this case all but one of the suction dredge mining actions are before the Hon. Judge Frank Roesch, Alameda County Superior Court, for all purposes. However, Petitioners point out in their reply that the *Walker* matter was dismissed on July 18, 2012. (The court can take judicial notice of the dismissal pursuant to Evid. Code § 452(d).) At this time, the *Walker* case is of no consequence to the Petition for Coordination.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The plaintiffs opposing the motion are: Karuk Tribe; Leaf Hillman; Leon Hillman; Craig Tucker; David Bitts; Center for Biological Diversity; Friends of the River; Klamath Riverkeeper; Pacific Coast Federal of Fishermen's Associations; Institute for Fisheries Resources; California Sportfishing Protection Alliance; Foothill Angler's Coalition; North Fork American River Alliance; Upper American River Foundation; and Central Sierra Environmental Resource Center. All are plaintiffs in Karuk I, Hillman, or Karuk II.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The Reply appears to have been filed on behalf of Kimble and PLP plaintiffs.

 Scott and Salmon River watersheds was illegal, and ordering DFG to "close all rivers to suction dredging that constitute habitat of the Coho [salmon] (and other species of special concern)" until it had completed an Environmental Impact Report (EIR). (RJN Ex. A.) In 2006, Gerald Hobbs, President of Public Lands for People ("PLP"), the New 49ers, and Raymond W. Koons were granted intervenor status. (Solomon Decl. ¶ 9.a.; RJN Exs. L & M.)

Although DFG initially denied the allegations in the *Karuk I* complaint, it subsequently admitted that suction and dredge mining in the specified areas *was* harmful to Coho salmon. The *Karuk I* plaintiffs and DFG entered into an agreement to allow judgment to be entered against DFG and to require DFG to conduct a new EIR of its regulations and to implement mitigation measures, if necessary, to protect the Coho salmon and other protected species in the watersheds of the Klamath, Scott and Salmon Rivers. The EIR and rule revision was to be completed within 18 months (i.e., by June 2008). The order was signed by Hon. Judge Bonnie Sabraw on December 20, 2006, over the objections of the intervenors. The *Karuk I* order does *not* prohibit or limit suction dredge mining in any watershed. The order specifies that the *Karuk I* plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief [ordering DFG to close rivers to suction dredge mining] was "withdrawn without prejudice." (RJN Ex. N.) In addition, plaintiffs' second cause of action, alleging violation of Fish and Game Code § 5653 was dismissed without prejudice. The court retained jurisdiction. (*Id.*) The case later was assigned to the Hon. Judge Frank Roesch.

# B. *Hillman* (Feb. 2009)

In February 2009, the Karuk Tribe, a number of other environmental and fishermen organizations, and individuals filed an action for injunctive relief in Alameda County Superior Court against DFG. On March 19, 2009, these plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint. (RJN Ex. B.) *Hillman* plaintiffs allege DFG failed to conduct the EIR mandated in *Karuk I*, and instead had continued issuing suction and dredge mining permits in violation of the *Karuk I* judgment. The *Hillman* plaintiffs sought to enjoin DFG

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from expending any public funds to process and issue mining permits until DFG completed the EIR and otherwise complied with the judgment in Karuk I. (RJN Ex. B.)

In April 2009, New 49ers, Raymond Koons, Gerald Hobbs, and PLP intervened. (RJN Ex. O; Solomon Decl. ¶ 9.b.) On July 9, 2009, Judge Roesch issued an order granting the Hillman plaintiffs' petition for preliminary injunction, ordering DFG to cease expending public funds to issue suction and dredge mining permits. Unlike the order in Karuk I, the injunction in Hillman prohibited DFG from using state general funds to issue any suction dredge mining permits at all, and was not limited to just the Klamath, Scott and Salmon Rivers. It did not specifically prohibit suction dredge mining-only the issuance of permits by DFG. The order also was silent as to the right of persons already owning such permits to continue to use them. (RJN Ex. P.) The trial court found that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of two out of three of their claims that the DFG was violating the law by issuing suction dredge permits.

Intervenors Hobbs and PLP appealed from that order. (RJN Ex. I.) On December 28, 2011, the Court of Appeal reversed the preliminary injunction. (RJN Ex. Q.) The Court concluded Fish & Game Code § 5653.1, enacted as part of SB 670 (Stats. 2009, ch. 62, § 1) and as amended by AB 120 (Stats. 2011, ch. 133, § 6) (effective July 26, 2011)), provided for the prohibition of the issuance of permits to operate suction dredge equipment until DFG certifies the CEQA review required under the 2006 consent order and consent judgment. This code section also prohibited any suction dredge mining in any river, stream or lake in California until the earlier of June 30, 2016 or DFG certifies the CEQA review required under the 2006 consent judgment, new regulations fully mitigating all identified significant environmental impacts are adopted and become operative, and a fee structure is in place to cover all costs to DFG related to administration of the program. (RJN Ex. Q, pp. 9-10.) The Court of Appeal concluded that the statutory prohibition renders the preliminary injunction

 superfluous. The Court stated there was no reason to believe that a determination on the merits could not be reached before 2016.<sup>5</sup> (RJN Ex. Q, pp. 11-12.)

With respect to the current status of the case, Petitioners state that currently pending is a motion by plaintiffs to lift the stay, which was set to be heard on May 3, 2012. (Solomon Decl. ¶ 9.b.) The opposition and reply does not discuss the current status and it is unclear the scope of the "stay" at issue and status of this motion.

## C. Enactment of SB 670 (effective Aug. 6, 2009)

On August 6, 2009, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed SB 670. That statute prohibited vacuum and suction dredge mining in "any river, stream, or lake of this state" until (1) the Director of DFG certifies to the Secretary of State that DFG has completed the EIR ordered in *Karuk I*; (2) DFG has filed a copy of its new regulations with the Secretary of State; and (3) those new regulations are operative. (SB 670, codified at Fish & Game Code, §5653.1). In essence, SB 670 prohibits DFG from issuing vacuum or suction dredge mining permits anywhere in the state until it complies with the judgment in *Karuk I*. Although the statute purports to be based on the injunction in *Karuk I*, its scope is not limited to the watersheds of the three rivers affected by the *Karuk I* injunction—the new law is substantially broader than the consent order. Moreover, the statute also exceeded the scope of the then *Hillman* injunction to the extent it not only prohibited DFG from issuing any new permits, but also actually prohibits suction dredge mining by anyone—presumably even those already in possession of a DFG permit.

# D. Kimble (Sept. 2010)

On September 15, 2010, Ben Kimble, Ronald Hansen, Ron Kliewer, Eric Rasbold, Gerald Hobbs, PLP, Patrick Keene, Keene Engineering Company, Inc., and Walt Wegner filed this action. Plaintiffs Kimble, Hansen, Kliewer, Hobbs, Keane, and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> As will be discussed, on June 27, 2012, SB 1018 was enacted, effective June 27, 2012. It repealed the June 30, 2016 date in Fish & Game Code § 5653.1, and imposed a moratorium on suction dredge mining until the DFG completes the environmental review as described in the consent order, required regulations are adopted and operative, and a fee structure is in place to cover the costs related to the administration of the program.

Wegner are miners who purchased permits from DFG to engage in vacuum and suction dredge mining on federal mining claims in California. As alleged, those permits were cancelled as a result of SB 670. Plaintiff Rasbold owns about 180 acres of federal mining claims located on federal land in El Dorado County and leased that land to suction dredge miners who mine the land for a fee. Plaintiff Hobbs is the President of PLP, a non-profit that advocates for miners and prospectors. Plaintiff Keene is the secretary/treasurer of a family-owned business, Keene Engineering Co., Inc., in Chatsworth, California. The business sells dredging and mining equipment to miners and prospectors throughout the United States.

On October 24, 2011, a first amended complaint was filed, adding as plaintiffs Terry and Delores Stapp, suction dredge miners in Sierra County, California. In addition, Ms. Stapp allegedly ran a gold prospecting store in San Bernardino, California from August 1, 1978 to March 2010. (RJN Ex. C.) It also added Gary Goldberg as plaintiff. He is a miner and prospector with mining claims on Federal lands in California and resides in San Bernardino, California. (RJN Ex. C.)

The action challenges the constitutionality of AB 670 and AB 120 (enacted July 2011). It alleges the following causes of action: (1) federal preemption; (2) violation of Calif. Constitution, art. X, §2; (3) violation of 16 U.S.C. §481 and 43 U.S.C. §661; (4) violation of the California Statehood Act; (5) denial of due process under the 5th and 14th amendments to the U.S. Constitution; <sup>6</sup> (6) denial of equal protection under the 14th amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I, §7(a) of the California Constitution; (7) environmental justice; (8) injunctive relief; (9) declaratory relief; and (10) damages.

In October 2010, Defendant DFG had filed a motion to transfer pursuant to CCP § 403 and CRC 3.500 in Alameda County, seeking to transfer the *Kimble* matter to Alameda County. As part of that motion, DFG took the position that the matter was not complex. (Saxton Decl. Ex. 14.) The motion to transfer was denied in December 2010.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> This cause of action appears to be a takings claim.

At the time the Petition for Coordination was filed, pending before the Court was defendants' demurrer to the first amended complaint and plaintiffs' application for a preliminary injunction.

## E. AB 120 (Effective July 26, 2011)

As discussed above, AB 120 (Stats. 2011, ch. 133, § 6), effective July 26, 2011, further amended Fish & Game Code § 5653.1 to provide that the prohibition on suction dredge mining would remain in place until the earlier of either June 30, 2016 or until the DFG certified a CEQA review as required under the 2006 consent order and consent judgment, new regulations that fully mitigate all identified significant environmental impacts were adopted and operative, and a fee structure was put in place. The first amended complaint filed in *Kimble*, added AB 120 to its challenge.

# F. DFG Regulations and Final CEQA Report (March 2012)

On March 16, 2012, DFG released its final CEQA report and revised regulations.<sup>7</sup>
On April 27, 2012, the Office of Administrative Law approved the regulations and submitted them to the Secretary of State. (Saxton Decl. ¶ 8 and Ex. 6.)

# G. Karuk II (April 2, 2012)

On April 2, 2012, Karuk Tribe, Center for Biological Diversity, Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen's Associations, Institute for Fisheries Resources, Friends of the River, California Sportfishing Protection Alliance, Foothill Anger's Coalition, North Fork American River Alliance, Upper American River Foundation, and Central Sierra Environmental Resource Center, filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. Named respondents/defendants are DFG and Charlton Bonham, Director of DFG. The petition was filed in Alameda County. (RJN Ex. D.)

These Petitioners/Plaintiffs assert the EIR did not comply with CEQA. They also seek to set aside the adopted regulatory suction dredge program as not in compliance

In support of this statement the opposition cites to Saxton Decl. Ex. 3, p. 3, which is the DFG's Case Status Report filed in the Karuk I matter and dated October 2, 2006. It is unclear why this document is being cited to.

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27 28 with Fish & Game Code. They seek declaratory relief that the decision to approve the suction dredge program constitutes a prejudicial abuse of discretion under the Fish & Game Code and CEQA. (Id.)

#### H. PLP (April 12, 2012)

On April 12, 2012, PLP, Gerald Hobbs, Western Mining Alliance, Eric Maksymyk, Gary Goldberg, Steve Tyler, Ron Kliewer, Patrick Keene, Keene Engineering Company, Inc., Terry Stapp, Delores Stapp, Ronald Hansen, Eric Rasbold, Walt Wegner and Paul Coambs filed a petition for writ of mandate and declaratory relief. Respondents/Defendants are DFG and Charlton Bonham. The petition was filed in San Bernardino County. (RJN Ex. E.)

Petitioners/Plaintiffs contend the new regulations are exempt from CEQA and challenged the final supplemental EIR under CEQA. They also challenge the procedure by which the regulations were adopted. In addition, they assert causes of action of federal preemption, violation of laws applicable to federal mining claims on federal land, violation of Federal and California Endangered Species Acts, denial of due process under federal and state constitutions, denial of equal protection under federal and state constitutions, injunctive relief, declaratory relief related to the new regulations, and damages. (RJN Ex. E)

#### l. New 49'ers (April 13, 2012)

On April 13, 2012, The New 49'ers, Inc., Steve Kleszyk, Billy and Chad Stanford, David Garey, David Ransom, Richard and Sue Burton, Elizabeth and Mark Cutler, Edward Murphy, Martha Cronin, Raymond Phillips, Robert and Anna Sonnenburg, Ray Derrick, Ronald Burnside, and Northwest Mining LLC, filed a complaint and petition for writ of mandate in Siskiyou County. Named defendants are State of California, DFG, and Charlton Bonham. All plaintiffs allegedly own mining claims in Siskiyou County. (RJN Ex. F.)

However, Petitioners assert the same fact in their petition. Given the allegations in the 2012 CEQA cases, it is undisputed approval of a final supplemental EIR and regulations occurred in March 2012.

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They too challenge the EIR as in violation of CEQA and the regulations as exceeding statutory authority under the Fish & Game Code. They also make class action allegations asserting the class is holders of federally-registered mining claims in California located, in whole or in part, within "Closed Areas" under the new regulations. An additional, potentially overlapping and conditional class is identified as those plaintiffs who are unable to obtain dredging permits on account of the cap of 1,500 permits when and if such permits are ever issued. A cause of action for inverse condemnation also is alleged. (RJN Ex. F.)

#### J. Motions To Transfer/Consolidate

On April 9, 2012 plaintiffs in Karuk I and Karuk II (Alameda County) filed a motion to consolidate the two actions. On May 3, 2012, Judge Roesch, granted the motion. On its own motion, the court also consolidated Hillman (Alameda County). (Saxton Decl. Ex. 9.)

On April 18, 2012, Karuk I plaintiffs filed a motion to transfer to Alameda County the PLP action (San Bernardino County) and New 49'ers action (Siskiyou County), pursuant to CCP § 403. On May 17, 2012, Judge Roesch, granted the motion. The court specifically found that that the opposition was incorrect in its position that the individual cases are "complex" as defined in CRC 3.400. The court stated. "Notwithstanding assertions that a court could determine the Siskiyou County action to be a class action and that the class action could be determined to be 'complex,' and notwithstanding the assertion that these cases are 'provisionally complex,' this court has determined that the cases and each of them are not 'complex.' This ruling does not determine whether the coordinated package of cases might not be later determined 'complex' under provisions of CRC 3.400(b)(4)." (Saxton Decl. Ex. 10, pp. 1-2) (emphasis added).)

The court's order included the findings required by CRC 3.500(d), including finding common questions of fact and law are predominating and significant to the litigation, in particular the EIR related to permits and regulations for the suction dredge

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mining program. With respect to convenience of parties, witnesses and counsel, the court noted that all four actions involve the same parties. PLP and New 49'ers had intervened in Karuk I and Hillman. Therefore, the court found, the actions were not likely to cause undue burden of parties who filed in San Bernardino and Siskiyou Counties. The court did not discuss the specifics of the individual defendants.8

In the meantime, on May 7, 2012, the Petition for Coordination was filed.

After the transfer of the PLP case to Alameda County, PLP filed a CCP § 170.6 preemptory challenge, which Judge Roesch granted on May 22, 2012. (Saxton Decl. Ex. 11.) All cases pending in Alameda were assigned to Hon. Evelio Grillo. With respect to the peremptory challenge, Karuk plaintiffs sought to rescind the May 22, 2012 Order. On June 19, 2012, Hon. Wynne S. Carvill, rescinded the Order as to all actions except PLP. (Saxton Decl. Ex. 13.) On June 21, 2012, New 49'ers plaintiffs filed their peremptory challenge. (Saxton Decl. Ex. 8.) According to Karuk plaintiffs, this matter was not ruled on because of the stay, this court issued as a result of the Petition for Coordination.

On June 1, 2012, Karuk plaintiffs filed a motion to transfer and consolidate the Kimble matter with previously consolidated matters pursuant to CCP § 403, 404.1 and CRC 3.400 and 3.500. In support of the motion, Karuk plaintiffs asserted that the matters were not complex, relying in part on Judge Roesch's Order transferring PLP and New 49'ers. The motion was set for hearing on June 27, 2012. However, on June 26, 2012, this court stayed all matters pending a determination on the Petition for Coordination.

On June 27, 2012, Judge Grillo issued an order continuing the motion to transfer the Kimble matter to September 12, 2012, in light of the pending Petition for Coordination. Judge Grillo noted that the parties to all six actions appear to agree that

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> In a footnote in an order regarding a peremptory challenge, Hon. Wynne S. Carvill, Supervising Judge Alameda County Superior Court, noted that there was some ambiguity as to whether these two cases were ordered consolidated with Karuk I and the cases already consolidated with Karuk I (Hillman and Karuk II). Judge Carvill

all six CEQA cases should be managed in a single department, by a single judge. The court also stated, "Although the decision is to be made by Judge Alvarez, this court would be inclined to find that although a single CEQA case might not be 'complex,' a proceeding comprised of six CEQA cases appears to be complex under CRC 3.400(c)(4) ('Environmental ... claims involving many parties.')." (Reply, Ex. D.)<sup>9</sup>

Therefore, Karuk I, Hillman, and Karuk II (collectively "Karuk cases"), are consolidated and pending before Judge Roesch in Alameda County, with Karuk I (RG05211597) listed as the lead case. The New 49'ers case is pending in Alameda County before Judge Roesch with a CCP § 170.6 motion pending. PLP is pending before Judge Grillo in Alameda County. Kimble is pending before this court, with a pending motion to transfer it to Alameda County and consolidate it with the consolidated Karuk cases pursuant to CCP § 403.

## K. July 2012 Legislation

As previously discussed in Footnote 5, on June 27, 2012, SB 1018 was enacted, effective June 27, 2012. It repealed the June 30, 2016 date in Fish & Game Code § 5653.1, and imposed a moratorium on suction dredge mining until DFG completes the environmental review as described in the consent order and consent judgment, required regulations are adopted and operative, and a fee structure is in place to cover the costs related to the administration of the program.

Section 5653.1 now also provides that to facilitate compliance, DFG is to consult with other agencies as necessary on or before April 1, 2013, and prepare and submit to the Legislature a report with recommendations on statutory changes or authorizations that, in DFG's determination, are necessary to develop suction dredge regulations,

concluded that no such consolidation was ordered as part of the transfer and that the motion did not refer to consolidation. (Saxton Decl. Ex. 13, p. 3, fn2.)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> The Court notes several exhibits are attached to the *Kimble* plaintiffs' Reply. A separate request for judicial notice or declaration in support was not filed in support. *Karuk* plaintiffs' opposition admits that the *Kimble* transfer motion was continued because of the stay. (Opp. p. 7:26.) The order also was attached to a request for judicial notice submitted with DFG's reply, Ex. B. The court can take judicial notice of the order pursuant to Evidence Code § 452(d).

 including recommendations relating to mitigation of all identified significant environmental impacts and a fee structure that will fully cover all program costs.

In their opposition, Karuk plaintiffs contend that as a result of the most recent amendments, the Department cannot simply "sit on the regulations" until 2016. It asserts the 2012 regulations and Final SEIR are not in compliance with Fish & Game Code § 5653.1, because they fail to mitigate identified significant environmental harms.

In the reply, *Kimble* and *PLP* plaintiffs assert that SB 1018 is extreme in its indefinite ban on all suction dredge mining. They assert that they and *Karuk* plaintiffs both agree the newly promulgated regulations regarding suction dredge mining are now invalid and must be withdrawn by the DFG. The reply states, "This is at least one issue upon which both the Karuk Tribe and the *Kimble* miners can agree." (*Kimble* Pls.' Reply, p. 4.) *Kimble* plaintiffs also assert that they will be seeking leave to amend their complaint given the recent amendment to Fish & Game Code § 5653.1.

#### DISCUSSION

## Legal Standard

Under CCP § 404, "[w]hen civil actions sharing a common question of fact or law are pending in different courts, a petition for coordination may be submitted to the Chairperson of the Judicial Council ... by all of the parties plaintiff or defendant in any such action." "A petition for coordination ... shall be supported by a declaration stating facts showing that the actions are complex, as defined by the Judicial Council and that the actions meet the standards specified in Section 404.1." (CCP § 404.)

"A 'complex case' is an action that requires exceptional judicial management to avoid placing unnecessary burdens on the court or the litigants and to expedite the case, keep costs reasonable, and promote effective decision making by the court, the parties, and counsel." (CRC 3.400(a).)

In deciding whether a case is complex, the court should consider whether the action is likely to involve (1) numerous pretrial motions raising difficult or novel legal

issues that will be time-consuming to resolve, (2) management of a large number of witnesses or substantial amount of documentary evidence, (3) management of a large number of separately represented parties, (4) coordination with related actions pending in one or more courts in other counties, or (5) substantial postjudgment judicial supervision. (CRC 3.400(b).) In addition, claims involving environmental claims involving many parties are provisionally complex. (CRC 3.400(c)(4).) Under CRC 3.502, the court must consider rule 3.400 *et seq.* in determining whether a case is a complex case within the meaning of CCP § 404.

The standards set forth in CCP § 404.1 are as follows: (1) whether the common question of fact or law is predominating and significant to the litigation; (2) the convenience of parties, witnesses, and counsel; (3) the relative development of the actions and the work product of counsel; (4) the efficient utilization of judicial facilities and manpower; (5) the calendar of the courts; (6) the disadvantages of duplicative and inconsistent rulings, orders, or judgment; and (7) the likelihood of settlement of the actions without further litigation should coordination be denied.<sup>10</sup>

## Request for Judicial Notice

With its petition, Petitioners request the court take judicial notice of 18 different documents, all of which are court records, court filings, or court orders from other related cases in state or federal court. Under Evidence Code §452(d), the court may take judicial notice of the records of any court of this state or of any other state or federal court. The court may take judicial notice of the existence of each document in a court file, but can only take judicial notice of the truth of facts asserted in documents such as orders, findings of fact and conclusions of law, and judgments." (Day v. Sharp

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> If actions are not complex, CCP § 403 allows for a court hearing of the actions to transfer other actions to that court and once transferred, without any further motion or hearing, order the cases consolidated for trial pursuant to CCP § 1048. Under CRC 3.500(d), if a court orders cases or cases to be transferred pursuant to CCP § 403, the court order must specify the reasons supporting a finding that the transfer will promote the ends of justice, with reference to the following standards: (1) the actions are not complex; (2) whether the common question of fact or law is predominating and significant to the litigation; (3) the convenience of the parties, witnesses, and counsel; (4) the relative development of the actions and the work product of counsel; (5) the efficient utilization of judicial facilities and

staff resources; (6) the calendar of the courts; (7) the disadvantages of duplicative and inconsistent rulings, orders, or judgments; and (8) the likelihood of settlement of the actions without further litigation should coordination be denied.

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- (15) Order in *Hillman* granting application to intervene by New 49'ers, Raymond Koons, Gerald Hobbs, and PLP (filed April 27, 2009) (Exhibit O);
- (16) Order in Hillman granting plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction (filed July 10, 2009) (Exhibit P);
- (17) Court of Appeal Decision re: Preliminary Injunction in *Hillman* (filed December 28, 2011) (Exhibit Q); and (18) Memorandum and Order dismissing federal *PLP* action (filed March 16, 2010) (Exhibit R).

These documents are proper subjects for judicial notice under §452(d), and the RJN is GRANTED in its entirety.

#### Analysis

## A. Actions Are Complex

When considered as a whole, the matters qualify as complex because they involve the coordination of related actions pending in more than one court in other counties. (CRC 3.400(b)(4).) Within Alameda County, these matters are now pending in several different courts with another CCP § 170.6 peremptory challenge pending. These cases also appear to be the types of cases that will involve numerous pretrial motions raising difficult and novel legal questions, including federal preemption and CEQA issues. (CRC 3.400(b)(1).) Many of these issues will come before the courts and be decided through briefing procedures for writ petitions with reference to the administrative record or through motions for summary judgment. As pointed out in the Petition, given the common issues and pretrial motions in the form of requests for injunctions, the matters should be coordinated.

The cases are likely to involve the management of potential for discovery on common issues related to suction dredge mining throughout the state. They also are likely to involve the management of a substantial amount of documentary evidence such as the administrative record related to the CEQA issues. (CRC 3.400(b)(2). Finally, given that requests for writs and injunctive and declaratory relief are at issue, the cases

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are likely to require substantial post-judgment supervision and that consistency in orders is important with respect to future post judgment enforcement issues. (CRC 3.400(b)(5).

The court also considers that these matters involve environmental claims involving many parties. As such, the cases are provisionally complex pursuant to CRC 3.400(c)(4).

When the opposition is considered, *Karuk* plaintiffs do not provide any specific argument that the cases are not complex. Instead, their argument is directed toward attacking the Petition for Coordination as "judge shopping," and discussing the peremptory challenges that occurred in Alameda County. However, the peremptory challenges were the result of the *PLP* and *New 49'ers* cases being transferred to Alameda County at the request of *Karuk* plaintiffs. The *PLP* challenge was reviewed by Judge Carvill and resulted in cases now proceeding before different judges in Alameda County.

Karuk plaintiffs also complain that coordination will allow for further mischief asserting that California Rule of Court 3.516 allows a peremptory challenge after assignment of a coordination trial judge and that "add-on" cases will raise the potential for additional § 170.6 motions by miners. However, coordination actually militates against successive § 170.6 challenges. CRC 3.516, applicable only upon the granting of a petition for coordination and after an order assigning a coordination trial judge, provides for a 20-day time period for making a peremptory challenge after service of the order assigning the judge to the coordination proceeding. It also provides that all plaintiffs or similar parties in the coordinated actions constitute a side and all defendants or similar parties in such actions constitute a side for purposes of applying CCP § 170.6. In addition, a party in a case "added on" to the coordinated proceedings cannot file a peremptory challenge once the 20-day time period has passed following the initial

 the initial assignment of the coordination judge. (Industrial Indem. Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 214 Cal. App. 3d 259, 263-265.)<sup>11</sup>

When considered, Karuk plaintiffs' argument supports a finding of complexity, to ensure consistency in rulings in the cases sharing common questions of fact and law that are currently pending in different courts.

#### B. Common Questions of Fact and Law

There is no dispute among the parties that the cases involve common question of fact and law. As previously discussed above, at issue in the cases is the propriety of dredge mining and issuance of new permits. In addition, *Kimble* and the new 2012 CEQA cases involve issues regarding Fish & Game Code § 5653.1. In *Hillman*, intervenors raised the issue of federal preemption of a prohibition on suction mine dredging and Fish & Game Code § 5653.1 also is implicated. Given the reference to *Karuk I* in Fish & Game Code § 5653.1, *Karuk I* also is related. *Karuk I*, *Hillman*, and *Karuk II* are now consolidated. *Kimble* and the 2012 CEQA cases also will involve issues regarding the propriety of the recent final supplemental EIR and recently adopted regulations. It is demonstrated that a sufficient number of common questions of fact and law predominate as set forth in the memorandum and declaration submitted in support of the Petition. To the extent that individual cases involve unique questions, such claims can be bifurcated to the extent necessary and later remanded or transferred as necessary.<sup>12</sup>

# Convenience of parties, witnesses, and counsel

These actions involve similar parties and counsel. However, many of the issues involving Fish & Game Code § 5653.1 and CEQA issues involve legal questions in which the convenience of the parties and counsel are served by resolution in a single

<sup>11</sup> Not cited by the parties.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> For example, the New 49'ers involves a potential class action with respect to an inverse condemnation claim that is not raised in the other actions. However, as the New 49'ers reply brief points out, once the suction dredge mining moratorium issue is decided, in the event it is upheld, the taking claims can be the subject to a motion to remand the claims to Siskiyou County.

forum. As the parties discuss, many of the principal parties have been litigating related actions in Alameda County, including New 49'ers, PLP, Karuk Tribe, Hobbs, and DFG. In addition, PLP, Hobbs, and DFG have been litigating in San Bernardino County. Allowing the matters to proceed as a coordinated proceeding in one forum will serve the convenience of the parties and counsel because common issues will be adjudicated in a single forum.

With respect to witnesses, given the legal underpinnings of the common issues, witness testimony is not expected to resolve the common legal issues. In addition, to the extent there are claims specific to plaintiffs, such as takings and inverse condemnation claims, such issues can be bifurcated and later, to the extent such claims become relevant depending on the resolution of the common legal/factual issues, remanded or transferred back to the original courts for resolution. Witnesses are not demonstrated to be severely impacted by coordination.

# D. Relative Development of the Actions and Work Product of Counsel

Karuk I was resolved through an Order and Consent Judgment as described above, with the court retaining jurisdiction. The 2012 CEQA cases are newly filed cases. Three of the cases, Karuk I, Hillman, and Karuk II, were consolidated at the beginning of May 2012. In light of the recent amendments to Fish & Game Code § 5653.1, consolidated Karuk cases, Kimble, PLP, and New 49'ers are in a similar procedural position. Coordination of the consolidated Karuk cases with the other three related cases will not implicate the development and work product of counsel.

E. Efficient Utilization of Judicial Facilities and Manpower; Calendar of the Court; and Disadvantages of Duplicative and Inconsistent Rulings, Order, or Judgments.

These factors should be considered together because they implicate similar concerns. Judicial facilities and resources will be used more efficiently if the cases are coordinated. Coordination also will avoid duplicative review of common questions of fact and law by separate courts. After the issue regarding the peremptory writs in

Alameda County, cases are now pending in two separate courts in Alameda County. Given the common issues, concern over duplicative and inconsistent rulings is at issue, especially considering that even in Alameda County the matters are not pending in the same tribunal. In addition, as discussed, similar legal issues are pending in San Bernardino County. The calendar of the courts supports coordination of these actions, because coordination promotes judicial economy and conservation of limited judicial resources. Coordination will facilitate consistency in rulings, order and judgments. Inconsistent rulings with respect to dredge mining and DFG permit issues also could make compliance with court orders difficult, if not impossible, for DFG. Coordination also is timely in light of the issues concerning the recently approved EIR, regulations, and amendments to Fish & Game Code § 5653.1.

These factors tend in favor of coordination before one judge.

## F. Likelihood of Settlement of the Actions without Further Litigation Should Coordination Be Denied

Given the evidence and arguments presented, coordination will increase the likelihood of settlement. Karuk plaintiffs complain that the miners have repeatedly demonstrated an ability and willingness to litigate in multiple venues. Coordination will preclude this and bring similarly interested parties on common issues of law and fact into the same forum. With coordination, likelihood of settlement increases because it will preclude the continuation of actions in other forums in a parties' effort to obtain favorable rulings.

#### G. Conclusion

Weighing the factors, the court finds that the actions at issue are complex and that the standards set forth in CCP § 404.1 support coordination. Therefore, the Petition for Coordination is granted.

# Site of Coordination Proceedings

Under CRC 3.530(a), if a petition for coordination is granted, the coordination motion judge must, in the order granting coordination, recommend to the Chair of the

 Judicial Council a particular superior court for the site of the coordination proceedings. The following factors are to be considered: (1) The number of included actions in a particular location; (2) Whether the litigation is at an advanced stage in a particular court; (3) The efficient use of court facilities and judicial resources; (4) The locations of witnesses and evidence; (5) The convenience of the parties and witnesses; (6) The parties' principal places of business; (7) The office locations of counsel for the parties, and (8) The ease of travel to and availability of accommodations in particular locations. (CRC 3.530(b).) The court also has to recommend an appropriate appellate court pursuant to CRC 3.505(a).

This is where the primary dispute regarding coordination exists. All parties except *Karuk* plaintiffs argue in favor of San Bernardino County as the site of coordination proceedings. Petitioners DFG and *Kimble* plaintiffs argue in support of coordination of the matters in San Bernardino County. They assert that such actions are properly venued here, because a large number of the miners reside in this county. They contend that San Bernardino County has the highest number of Federal mining claims in California with 11,333 total Federal Mining Claims and 6,235 placer claims within that total number. (Solomon Decl. ¶ 25.) They also contend that this court invited the petition for coordination and intimated that San Bernardino might be the appropriate site for the coordinated action. (Solomon Decl. ¶ 3.)

The opposition argues that the matter should be located in Alameda County. They contend that six of the seven actions at issue are currently in Alameda County, including one action that is not subject to the Petition. However, that one action, Walker, was dismissed. They also argue that the Coalition, environmentalists and small-scale fishermen would suffer an extreme hardship if San Bernardino County was

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> In its reply Petitioner DFG also contended that Sacramento County is an appropriate location. At the hearing, Sacramento County was largely rejected by other parties. Because Sacramento was not offered as a site until the reply and all other parties appear to reject it, the Court will not consider Sacramento County any further.

chosen. However, there is no particular argument or evidence offered as to why this is the case.

Karuk plaintiffs also assert they are represented by the Environmental Law Foundation, a small non-profit, located in Oakland, California. Their counsel states Environmental Law Foundation has represented the Karuk Tribe since 2005, and Lynn Saxton is lead counsel in Karuk I, Hillman, and Karuk II. Saxton asserts these three actions were brought on a pure contingency basis and if the actions were moved to San Bernardino for litigation, it would pose a severe financial hardship on counsel. (Saxton Decl. ¶ 18.)

In reply, *Kimble* plaintiffs and DFG again assert that the 3.530(b) factors favor San Bernardino. They argue that none of the parties reside in Alameda County. (See Solomon Reply Decl. ¶ 6.) They again assert that two of the six actions were initiated in San Bernardino County. *Kimble* plaintiffs also assert that its action is comprised of men and a woman of modest means and it would be a hardship economically and physically to travel to Alameda County and asserts that as a practical matter, for most of them it would be an impossibility. However, no specific evidence in support is provided. This assertion also is mitigated by the fact that many of these plaintiffs allegedly hold federal mining claims in counties located outside San Bernardino County and many are in Northern California. The argument in favor of San Bernardino County is based primarily on the fact that many of the *Kimble* plaintiffs reside here.

New 49'ers plaintiffs' reply also argues that the Kimble issues predominate. Therefore, the coordinated actions should be heard in this court. They contend that Karuk I and Hillman should be dismissed and that they have no continuing vitality. They assert that DFG has fashioned new administrative rules on a new administrative record and has fully complied with the consent decree and the Tribe and the miners have commenced new cases that put a new record at issue. They argue that an order granting a Petition for Coordination would, under CRC 3.516, restart the clock for any peremptory challenge and past filings are of little significance. They also assert that in

 light of recent legislative amendments, the issue with respect to Fish & Game Code § 5653.1 and its enforceability is susceptible to resolution by summary judgment and the issue of Federal Supremacy has the potential to moot all other issues. In addition, the CEQA challenge could wait until resolution of such issue and if it needs to go forward it will be resolved on an administrative record.

As the discussion below outlines, when the specific factors of CRC 3.530(b) are considered in light of the parties' arguments in the briefing and at the hearing, they favor coordination in San Bernardino County.

## A. Number and Location of Actions

The parties argue in favor of site coordination in either Alameda or San Bernardino County. Even if the court accepts *New 49'ers* plaintiffs' argument that *Karuk I* and *Hillman* should be dismissed in light of subsequent legislation, the final supplemental EIR, and recently enacted regulations, these two cases and *Karuk II* were consolidated for all purposes and pending with *Karuk I* as the lead case. (Saxton Decl. Ex. 9.) Therefore, given transfers and consolidation of matters, there currently are three cases pending in Alameda County: consolidated *Karuk I*, *PLP* (originally filed in San Bernardino County), and *New 49ers* (originally filed in Siskiyou County). However, the transfers of two of the Alameda County cases *PLP* and *New 49ers* occurred on May 17, 2012, after the Petition for Coordination at issue had been filed. Therefore, the numbers and location of actions are skewed in favor of Alameda County, given these recent transfers. *Kimble* is pending in San Bernardino. An attempt in Fall 2010 to transfer that action to Alameda County was denied in December 2010. Another motion to transfer currently is pending.

Under the circumstances, the number and location of cases do not favor either County.

# B. Whether Litigation is at an Advanced State in a Particular Court

Given that recently approved EIR and regulations and given the recent amendments to Fish & Game Code § 5653.1, litigation is not in an advanced state in

 any particular court. At this time, it appears the primary issue is the federal preemption argument with respect to Fish & Game Code § 5653.1, which has been raised in Kimble, PLP, and New 49ers. Until the transfers of cases to Alameda County in May 2012, two of these cases were pending in San Bernardino County and one was pending in Siskiyou County. Plaintiffs in these actions argue in favor of San Bernardino County for the site of coordination proceedings.

At the time of the Petition, this court in *Kimble* already had held a hearing on defendant's demurrer to the first amended complaint and plaintiffs' application for a preliminary injunction. The hearing was continued for additional briefing and, ultimately, continued due to the Petition for Coordination.

As for the other cases, the consent order and consent judgment was issued in Karuk I. In Hillman, a preliminary injunction issued by the trial court prohibiting DFG from using state general funds to issue any suction dredge mining permits was reversed in light of Fish & Game Code § 5653.1. The appellate court did not decide any substantive issues that intervenors raised regarding the federal preemption issue. (RJN Ex. O.) Hillman is not in an advanced state in light of § 5653.1.

When the arguments are considered, this factor leans in favor of San Bernardino County. The primary issue is federal preemption, which is raised by the *Kimble*, *PLP*, and *New 49'ers* plaintiffs, all of whom argue in favor of San Bernardino County as the site of the coordination proceedings.

# C. Efficient Use of Court Facilities and Judicial Resources

When considered, this factor does not favor any of the counties the parties seek. Regardless of the location of site coordination, files will have to be transferred and the use of judicial resources for such endeavor will occur.

# Location of Parties and Witnesses; Locations of Witnesses and Evidence; and Parties' Principal Places of Business

It appears common legal issues can be resolved without the aid of witnesses, given the issues regarding federal preemption and CEQA. In addition, when the parties'

 residences and principal places of business are considered, the parties are all through California, both north and south, and in other states, such as Nevada, Florida, North Carolina (New 49'ers), and Oregon (New 49'ers), Texas (New 49'ers).

New 49'ers plaintiffs assert that the primary common legal issues involving Fish & Game Code § 5653.1 can be resolved through summary judgment proceedings. In addition, CEQA petition issues are resolved through filings with the court, and reference to the administrative record, and counsel's oral argument at a hearing.

To the extent issues unique to particular plaintiffs are at issue, such as questions of damages or inverse condemnation claims, procedures exists for bifurcation of issues and remand or transfer back to court in which the actions were originally filed for resolution should it become necessary.

However, it is not demonstrated that any parties or potential witnesses are located in Alameda County. San Bernardino County is demonstrated to be the residence of many of the *Kimble* plaintiffs and to have a connection to the issues presented in the cases. This issue favors San Bernardino County.

# Office Locations of Counsel for Parties and Ease of Travel to and Availability of Accommodations in Particular Locations

Counsel in favor of Petition for Coordination has been litigating various issues in Alameda County for some time, which includes counsel representing DFG defendants and counsel for plaintiffs/intervenors PLP, Hobbs, New 49ers, and Koons. Therefore, office location, travel, and availability of accommodations in Alameda County are not at issue. As for *Karuk* plaintiffs, although they complain about travel to and accommodations in San Bernardino County, their argument is directed toward financial considerations of counsel. The *Karuk* cases were taken on a contingency fee. In this respect, this argument does favor Alameda County.

#### F. Conclusion

When the CRC 3.530(b) factors are considered as a whole, they weigh in favor of San Bernardino County. It appears the only reason for the venue of cases in Alameda

County was defendant DFG is a state agency and the Attorney General has an office in Oakland, California. However, DFG argues in favor of San Bernardino County. The fact *Karuk I* and *Hillman* were pending before the other cases does not necessitate that Alameda County be the site of the coordination proceedings. It is not demonstrated that in either of these cases the issues which are now ripe for review, such as federal preemption, have been considered or decided. When this court considers the circumstances of the cases, the location of parties to the actions, and the federal preemption issue, which is the heart of the *Kimble* matter, the factors to be considered weigh in favor of San Bernardino County. Therefore, the court recommends San Bernardino County as the site for the coordination proceedings.

Finally, given that the actions subject to coordination are within the jurisdiction of more than one reviewing court, pursuant to CRC. 3.505(a), the court recommends the appellate court having jurisdiction with respect to matters filed in San Bernardino County, which is the Fourth Appellate District, Division Two.

#### DISPOSITION

GRANT the Petition to Coordinate. When the evidence and arguments are considered, the actions are complex and meet the standards of CCP § 404.1 in favor of coordination. In addition, after consideration of CRC 3.530, San Bernardino County is recommended as the site of the coordination proceedings. The Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, is recommended as the court of appellate jurisdiction of the coordinated action.

Dated this \_\_\_\_\_day of September, 2012.

DONALD R. ALVAREZ
Judge of the Superior Court

RULING ON PETITION FOR COORDINATION

#### IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

#### IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

#### SAN BERNARDINO DISTRICT, CIVIL DIVISION

TITLE OF CASE (ABBREVIATED):

KIMBLE, et al v HARRIS, ET AL

CASE NUMBER:

CIVDS 1012922

#### DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY MAIL

My business address is: San Bernardino Superior Court, 303 West Third Street, San Bernardino, California 92415.

I hereby declare that I am a citizen of the United States, over the age of 18, employed in the abovenamed county, and not a party to nor interested in this proceeding. On <u>October 3, 2012</u>, I deposited in the United States mail at San Bernardino, California, a sealed envelope (postage prepaid) which contained a true copy of the attached:

#### NAME OF DOCUMENT:

#### RULING ON PETITION FOR COORDINATION

which was addressed as follows:

Name and Address of Persons Served:

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At the time of mailing this notice there was regular communication between the place of mailing and the place(s) to which this notice was addressed.

I declare under penalty of perjury the foregoing to be true and correct.

DATED: 10-3-12

ALVINA J. HOLLENSBE Administrative Assistant II